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5Preface
This report discusses the current dynamics of trade union (TU) support mechanisms, based 
on a comparative study encompassing 25 TUs in 18 countries1. In view of the debate on the 
effectiveness of international development, and of CSOs’ voice within that debate, there is a need 
to gain greater understanding of how donors support different groups of CSOs, and of the way 
in which this affects their activities on the ground. Over the past few years, several development 
agencies, and the OECD-DAC have conducted studies on donor support mechanisms for CSOs, 
although they have focused primarily on NGOs as the main recipients of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) support for civil society. Other CSOs, such as women’s organisations, religious 
organisations, cooperatives, social movements, and trade unions, have received less attention in 
these studies. This report was requested by the Trade Union Development Cooperation Network 
(TUDCN), in order to map out and review the international landscape for trade union donor 
support mechanisms in the development cooperation field.
The report concludes that donors have acknowledged the diversity of civil society organisations 
in theory, but have failed to do so in their support mechanisms. A one-size-fits-all approach 
is often adopted for all CSOs. In general, donor control over TUs has increased, leaving less 
room for them to be flexible and to work on development issues in accordance with their views 
and requirements. In some countries, TUs have seen a shift from framework agreements or 
programme support towards tendering procedures or project support (e.g. the FNV in the 
Netherlands, the TUC in the UK, or the ICTU in Ireland). Moreover, the PCM approach has become 
stricter, and more top-down and prescriptive (e.g. the Solidarity Centre in the US, ISCOS in Italy, 
LO-TCO in Sweden, ELA in Spain, and LO in Norway). The changes have been less marked in 
other countries. For the ACV and the ABVV in Belgium, SASK in Finland, Solidar in Switzerland, 
Iscod in Spain, or the DGB and FES in Germany, the framework agreement system has remained 
stable. For other organisations, such as the LO/FTF Council in Denmark, the LO in Norway or 
the CFDT in France, there has been a transition from a project-based to a programme-based 
approach where funding terms are concerned.
This report identifies the need for donors to move towards actor-based support mechanisms, 
and to make use of the differences between TUs and CSOs in a complementary way. Moreover, 
donors should take TUs’ particularities into account, by providing long-term and flexible support, 
for instance, and by allowing them to operate elsewhere than in the least developed countries 
(LDCs), in order to combat increasing inequalities in middle-income countries, where 75% of the 
world’s poor live, and by recognising the difficulty of measuring the impact of TU development 
activities. The implications for TUs are that they could be more proactive in emphasising their 
specific features, could increase their efforts to create common learning frameworks, and could 
actively work towards an alternative discourse on the dominant donor-oriented aid effectiveness 
paradigm.
1 We will henceforth use the term “TUs” to refer to genuine TUs, Trade Union Support Organisations, or TUSSOs (such as the Solidarity Centre), 
and in one case even to a political foundation working on trade union solidarity, all of which were interviewed in the course of our research.
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AAA Accra Agenda for Action 
ABVV-FGTB Algemeen Belgisch Vakverbond-Fédération Générale du Travail de Belgique (B) 
(General Federation of Belgian Labour)
ACLVB-CGSLB Algemene Centrale der Liberale Vakbonden - Centrale Générale des Syndicats 
Libéraux de Belgique (B) (General Confederation of Liberal Trade Unions of Belgium)
ACV- CSC Algemeen Christelijk Vakverbond-Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens (B) (Confederation of 
Christian Trade Unions)
AFD Agence Française de Développement (F) (French Development Agency)
CFDT Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (F) (French Democratic Confederation of 
Labour)
CLA Collective Labour Agreement
CNV Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond (NL) (National Federation of Christian Trade Unions)
CSO Civil Society Organisation
DAC (OECD) Development Assistance Committee OECD
DANIDA Danish International Development Agency (DK)
DFID Department for International Development (UK)
DGD Directorate-General for Development Cooperation (B)
EC European Commission
EU European Union
FNV Dutch Trade Union Federation (NL)
GUF Global Union Federation
HIVA Hoger Instituut voor de Arbeid (B) (Research Institute for Work and Society) 
HLF High Level Forum
ISCOS Instituto Sindacale per la Cooperazione e lo Sviluppo (I) (Trade Unions Institute for 
Development Cooperation)
ITUC International Trade Union Confederation
LO Landsorganisasjonen i Norge (N) (Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions) 
LO/FTF Council Landsorganisationen i Danmark/Fallesraadet for Danske Tjenestemands-og 
Funktionaerorganisationer (DK) (Danish Federation of Trade Unions/Danish Confederation of Salaried 
Employees and Civil Servants) Council 
LO-TCO Landsorganisationen Tjänstemännens centralorganisation (Secretariat of International Trade 
Union Development Cooperation) (SE)
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
NED National Endowment for Democracy (US)
NGO Non-governmental Organisation
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ODA Official Development Assistance
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PCM Project Cycle Management
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RBM Results-Based Management
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SIDA Swedish International Development Agency (SE)
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9Foreword
International solidarity has been the trade union movement’s core principle and mission 
throughout its history, and remains so now, more than ever.
Workers support the organisation and struggles of their colleagues in other countries in various 
ways and through various systems of solidarity funding. 
As development actors in their own right, trade unions in Southern countries, like their partners in the 
North, play an important and often crucial role in economic, social, and political development. Many of 
the struggles for independency and de-colonisation were led by trade unions; and trade unions were 
at the forefront of fighting dictatorships in many parts of the world. More recently, the Arab Spring once 
again demonstrated trade unions’ commitment to democracy and to better livelihoods for people.
In many donor countries, trade unions have been recognised as development actors, and 
funding has been made available to support the efforts made by trade unions and their partners 
to promote a more sustainable, participative, and fair development path. Building effective 
domestic institutions and mechanisms for inclusive development based on the democratic 
ownership of policies remains a crucial challenge for the trade union movement. 
As part of an effort to support a more coordinated approach to traditional bilateral cooperation, 
the Trade Union Development Cooperation Network (TUDCN) has drawn up the Trade Union 
Development Effectiveness Principles and Guidelines2, and is promoting its Trade Union 
Development Effectiveness Tool (TUDEP)3, in order to improve dialogue and shared ownership 
within trade union development cooperation partnerships.  
This report examines the various ways in which trade unions have been working with donor 
country development agencies, and provides a snapshot of trade union experiences over the 
past few years. However, due to the pressure of the financial downturn, the situation is evolving 
rapidly in many countries. 
The report draws a number of evidence-based conclusions, which point out the eclectic nature 
of policies in donor countries, despite the efforts that have been and are being made to come 
to a better and common understanding of approaches, practices, mechanisms, and tools for 
increased development effectiveness. 
In addition to the surveys commissioned by donors themselves, including the OECD-DAC peer 
reviews and the How Donors Work with CSOs4 study (2011), this review focuses on trade unions 
as specific and unique actors in the development field. 
2 Trade Union Development Effectiveness Principles and Guidelines, TUDCN, ITUC, 2011 
3 Trade Union Development Effectiveness Tool (TUDEP), TUDCN, ITUC, http://www.ituc-csi.org/tu-development-effectiness-profile.html?lang=en
4 How DAC members work with civil society organisations: An overview 2011, OECD-DAC, 2011, http://www.oecd.org/dac/howdacmember-
sworkwithcivilsocietyorganisationsanoverview2011.htm 
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The report also questions the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach, and market-inspired but inappropriate 
forms of contracting practices, which, in many ways exclude social movements from the NGO-
dominated development business, and therefore from support opportunities and sustainability 
in their development efforts. Its conclusions recommend a dialogue based approach instead 
of anonymous, short-term and market-driven procedures for involving social movements in 
development programmes. 
As already mentioned, this study is a snapshot; and its conclusions are therefore not carved in 
stone. They are primarily an invitation to further reflection and dialogue and to learn from one 
another’s practices, which allows donors, governments, multilateral institutions, and trade union 
partners in the field to share the lessons learned, and to improve the support for trade union 
efforts to contribute to the inclusive and sustainable development path that we are all advocating. 
Jan Dereymaeker
Coordinator of the Trade Union Development Cooperation Network
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Introduction
Together with the increased presence of CSOs in the development effectiveness debate, as 
described in the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) and at the Fourth High Level Forum (4HLF) 
in Busan (2011), trade unions (TUs) are increasingly making their voices heard. This report 
addresses the issue of bilateral donor-trade union support mechanisms, and, to a lesser extent, 
the support mechanisms provided by the EU and its effect on TUs’ development cooperation 
efforts. 
An initial review of the published research reveals that a large amount of development-oriented 
research on civil society actually focuses on the role of non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) in development (Tomlinson, 2006). This is also the case where the study of support 
mechanisms is concerned. As a follow-up to the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), and to the 
Open Forum process on CSOs and development effectiveness (2009-2011), and in preparation 
of the 4HLF in Busan in the autumn of 2011, several studies have been conducted, which 
focus on the relationship between donors and CSOs in terms of the development effectiveness 
debate (BetterAid, 2011; NORAD, 2008; Hedman & McDonnell, 2011; Fich, 2011; Giffen & 
Judge, 2010; and Pratt, 2009). However, the focus of these studies has been, either explicitly or 
implicitly, on NGOs, and has somewhat neglected other important members of civil society, such 
as women’s organisations, cooperatives, religious organisations, and trade unions. This report is 
a first step in filling this gap, as it examines the support mechanisms created by Western donors 
for TUs involved in development work.
This research has been commissioned by the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC)’s 
Trade Union Development Cooperation Network (TUDCN), with a view to examining good and bad 
donor practices for TU support. The research builds on an earlier quantitative survey conducted 
by the TUDCN (2010) among 14 trade unions in 10 countries. The survey was complemented by 
in-depth interviews, and by a review of the relevant documentation5. HIVA, the Research Institute 
for Work and Society, was asked to conduct the study. 
The aims of the study were:
l to map out current donor policies and practices where TU support mechanisms are 
concerned;
l to identify the specific characteristics of TUs as development actors, and their implications 
for donor support mechanisms;
l to place the study’s findings in the context of the existing research;
l to identify good and bad practices by comparing support frameworks in 18 countries.
The methodology used to achieve this aim initially involved semi-structured telephone interviews 
5 28 interviews were conducted in 18 countries for the purpose of this research. 
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with representatives of 25 trade unions and labour NGOs in 18 countries, and then screening 
key policy documents from donors as well as the TUs themselves, together with other relevant 
publications6. The following reports were reviewed in order to capture the dynamics of CSO 
support mechanisms.
Table 1. 1 Reports on CSO support mechanisms
Authors Year Donors reviewed Methodology Commissioned 
by
Hedman & 
McDonnell
2011 24 (all DAC 
members)
Screening of DAC peer 
reviews. 2 web surveys 
(DAC Donors + 7 NGO 
umbrella organisations)
OECD-DAC
Giffen & Judge 2010 14 donors 
(11 bilateral and 
3 multilateral)
Review of policy 
documents, and 
interviews
DFID
Pratt 2009 4 donors (in 
Denmark, UK, the 
Netherlands and 
Sweden)
Review of CSO policies INTRAC
Scanteam 2008 Nordic+ donors 
(CSO support 
programmes in 
six developing 
countries)
Review of policy 
documents and 
publications, and 
interviews with Nordic+ 
representatives and 
various CSOs
Nordic+ donors 
(Canada, 
Finland, Ireland, 
Sweden, the UK, 
and Norway)
Tembo et al. 2007 DFID (25 
civil society 
programmes)
Review of the 
documents for the 
25 programmes, and 
interviews with country 
and programme offices 
DFID
6 We will henceforth use the term “TUs” to refer to genuine TUs, Trade Union Support Organisations, or TUSSOs (such as the Solidarity 
Centre), and in one case even to a political foundation working on trade union solidarity, which were interviewed in the course of our 
research. 
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COM 
(European 
Commission)
2002 EC (Cooperation 
between EC and 
NSAs from 1991 to 
2001)
Examination of the 
financial support for 
NSAs through various 
EC budget lines
EC
European 
Court of 
Auditors
2009 EC (benchmarking 
based on the 
Netherlands and 
Sweden)
Review of policy 
documents, interviews, 
assignments, and 
benchmarking
EC
The first section of the report highlights the political relevance of the study, and is followed by 
a review of publications on CSOs and development effectiveness, and of the role of TUs within 
this process. Next, we present the findings from the primary data, and examine the current 
support mechanisms used by donors, the level of back-donor compliance required from the 
TUs, the impact of PCM obligations, and the comparative advantage of TUs over other CSOs. The 
last section of the report identifies good and bad donor practices, based on which some policy 
recommendations will be drawn up for back-donors, as well as for TUs.
1. Why examining TU support mechanisms is important
This section briefly discusses the study’s key issue, and its political relevance. In the autumn of 
2010, the TUDCN network conducted a web survey, in order to increase its understanding of 
the different support mechanisms used by back-donors for TUs. The survey revealed that there 
were significant differences between the financial support procedures, and the translation of those 
procedures into practice. As these differences have significant consequences for the way TUs 
organise their development work, the TUDCN asked HIVA to deepen and extend the initial research.
Since the AAA (2008), CSOs have been recognised as actors in the development field in 
their own right. Furthermore, CSOs have come together via the BetterAid Platform, and have 
established their own principles on development effectiveness, in order to complement the 
Paris Declaration, which has been criticized for predominantly focusing on donor-government 
relationships (Tomlinson, 2006: 1; BetterAid, 2011). Multiple studies have been conducted in 
order to understand current donor-CSO relationships. In general, however, the studies are biased 
towards major CSO donor-funding recipients and national and international development NGOs, 
and are donor-driven (Scanteam, 2008; Hedman & McDonnell; Giffen & Judge, 2010; Pratt, 
2009). There is also a tendency to describe CSOs as one homogenous group, which may, 
on the one hand, contribute towards a harmonized approach, but restricts CSOs from taking 
progressive and innovative approaches on the other (Gallin, 2000; COM, 2002). This was also 
one of the European Commission’s Structured Dialogue’s main findings and recommendations, 
which highlighted the need for an ‘appropriate mix of aid modalities () to best respond to the 
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widest possible range of actors’7. Although donors want to support ‘a more diverse and vibrant 
civil society’, in reality this desire often does not coincide with actual donor commitments in 
terms of harmonisation and alignment. This often leads to increased support for well-established 
international NGOs (Scanteam, 2008: 1). Investigating donors’ support for a non-traditional civil 
society, from a CSO’s point of view, as discussed by Tembo et al. (2007), is therefore timely and 
essential if we want to obtain a comprehensive understanding of good donor principles with 
regard to CSOs. 
This report will focus on TUs as important, but somehow less visible members of the development 
community. The importance of TUs as development actors lies in their ability to reach out to 
large segments of society through their membership-based democratic partners in developing 
countries. TUs play an important role as members of the tri-partite dialogue8, which enables them 
to influence legislation and to put pressure on private and public sector actors to respect labour 
rights, and human rights in general. In addition, their membership of international organisations, 
like the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) or the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) gives them an advantage, in terms of being able to rely not only on a well-established global 
network, but also on an established legal framework that is part of the UN system.
In addition, given the increased focus on the role of the private sector in development, an 
argument can be made for simultaneously strengthening TUs in developing countries, in order 
to enable them to play their complementary role. Finally, the TUs strong emphasis on distributive 
issues enables them to play a significant complementary role in Middle Income Countries (MICs).
The logical consequence is that TUs are asserting themselves in the development effectiveness 
debate, as illustrated, for example, by the creation of the TUDCN in 2008, and by the publication 
of the Trade Union Principles and Guidelines on Development Effectiveness in 2011. The TUDCN 
has contributed to monitoring the implementation of the Paris Declaration, by developing indicators 
on democratic ownership (OECD-DAC, 2011). The ITUC also took part in the aforementioned Open 
Forum process (Open Forum; Dereymaeker, 2007). This report argues that it is important to examine 
TU-donor relationships, since TUs are a distinct group within CSOs, with particular characteristics 
and needs. As this study will also illustrate, some of the TUs’ specific strengths cannot be fully 
utilised when support mechanisms treat civil society as a homogenous entity (Thomas, 1999).
However, it is important to recognise that TUs are not new actors in the development field. 
Since their foundation, their core interest has always been to enhance the overall wellbeing of 
their constituencies, and they have supported the strengthening of political, social and industrial 
democracy where civil rights are protected and poverty is eliminated (Gallin, 2000). 
7 In 2010, the European Commission (EC) began a dialogue process with a broad group of CSOs, in response to the Aid Effectiveness 
Agenda and to the AAA. This process is henceforth referred to as the Structured Dialogue (EC Technical Assistance Team, 2011).
8 Tri-partite dialogue refers to the dialogue between governments, TUs and employers. Tripartism can take many forms; however, the key 
factor according to Michel Hansenne, Director General of the International Labour Office (ILO), is ‘the commitment to preserve the inde-
pendency of the social partners and the recognition by each one of the role which the others must be allowed to play’ (ILO: 27.09.1995).
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In conclusion, as 4HLF in Busan comes to a close, we are on the brink of pivotal changes 
within the aid architecture . Trade Unions have ‘a major role to play in sustainable, inclusive 
development and participatory democracy’; therefore, gaining insight into the way in which their 
efforts can be improved and how donors can help in this regard is essential (Thomas, 1999).
2. The current dynamics of CSOs’ involvement in  
international cooperation
This section reviews the published research on CSO support mechanisms, and places the 
debate within a broader dynamic, as part of the architecture of international aid. Our review 
discusses the increased involvement of CSOs in the aid-development effectiveness debate. 
As will be explained, there are strong arguments in favour of opting for a comprehensive or 
holistic interpretation of development effectiveness when considering the role that CSOs play 
in development. Such an approach allows for TUs to make full use of their distinctive qualities 
as development actors. After clarifying this point, our review focuses on how donors cooperate 
with CSOs, and on what this implies for their activities. This mapping exercise will serve as a 
benchmark, against which specific TU support mechanisms will be assessed. 
2.1 A holistic interpretation of development effectiveness
During the last decade, the international development scene has been preoccupied with questions 
regarding the effectiveness or non-effectiveness of aid. Many studies have been published, with 
a view to understanding and explaining why aid flows have often had such disappointing results. 
In 2005, the donor community proved its commitment to this issue via the Paris Declaration 
(2005), which aimed at increasing aid effectiveness by adopting donor strategies based on 
harmonisation, alignment, country ownership, RBM and mutual accountability. Although the 
Paris Declaration has been put forward as a document that is applicable to all development 
actors, CSOs have questioned the document’s universality, and have also contested the fact that 
they were not involved in its drafting (Tomlinson, 2006: 1). In line with the shift in donor policies 
towards increased government involvement in developing countries, the Paris Declaration is 
predominantly a document about donor-government relationships (Tomlinson, 2006: 1; Agg, 
2006).
CSOs, however, lobbied for a voice in the aid-effectiveness debate in the run-up to the 3HLF in 
Accra. The AAA (2008) ended up recognising CSOs as development actors in their own right, 
and not merely as contractors of donor priorities, in line with the recommendations made by the 
advisory group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness (Report on Roundtable 6, 2008; Lavergne, 
2008). The need to create an enabling environment for civil society in developing and developed 
countries was also emphasised. CSOs raised the discussion to a higher level, by adopting a 
more comprehensive definition of aid effectiveness, which resulted in the term development 
effectiveness encompassing more than donor-government relationships, and by stressing the 
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importance of policies and practices (e.g. trade, investment, and agricultural policies, etc.) 
outside the aid relationship (Report on Roundtable 6, 2008). In parallel to the discussions during 
the HLFs, CSOs established the Open Forum on CSO Development Effectiveness. The Open 
Forum is a global process that encompasses hundreds of CSOs from around the world, and 
resulted in the adoption of the Istanbul Principles for CSO Development Effectiveness in 2010. 
These principles build on the Paris Declaration from a civil society perspective, but also add 
additional issues, such as promoting gender equality and respect for human rights and social 
justice. Finally, in preparation for Busan, the civil society community pinpointed four key issues 
through the Better Aid Platform, which initiated the shift from aid to development effectiveness 
(2011: 1). The issues in question are:
l fully assessing and exploring the Paris and Accra commitments;
l boosting development effectiveness through practices based on human rights 
standards, gender equality, and on the Decent Work Agenda;
l supporting CSOs as independent development actors in their own right, and 
committing to an enabling environment for their work in all countries;
l promoting an equitable and fair development cooperation architecture.
The core message from CSOs is ensuring that the commitments are respected, and that their 
perception of effectiveness is incorporated into the discussions. 
There are several reasons why it is important to incorporate CSOs in the debate on development 
effectiveness. First, they contribute a significant amount of funding to development cooperation. 
Worthington and Pippa (2010: 29) point out that the aid flow from Private Development Assistance 
(PDA) is significant, especially when taking into account that only 37% of ODA actually goes to 
country programmes, while PDA generally contributes to domestic development programmes 
and to community-level needs in a more direct manner (Worthington and Pippa, 2010: 30). 
Second, CSOs have distinct characteristics, which, it has been argued, lead to a comparative 
advantage, e.g. their proximity to beneficiaries and their ability to reach the poor (Riddell et 
al., 1997, 2008). Third, CSOs play certain effective roles as promoters of citizen participation 
and democracy. Finally, they are important actors in raising awareness about global injustice in 
Northern countries (Tomlinson, 2006: 2).
In order to improve the current complex development architecture, it is vital that all the relevant 
partners are respected, and engage in the process of finding solutions to the ineffectiveness of 
development.
2.2 Working with or through CSO: an insight into the donor-CSO relationship
Over the past four years, donor agencies have shown an increased interest in understanding their 
relationship with CSOs, which has led to several reviews of the issue. As indicated, DFID, NORAD, 
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OECD-DAC, the European Commission, and others have all commissioned research on the way 
in which their organisations cooperate with CSOs, and more specifically on the use of various 
support mechanisms and their impact (Giffen & Judge, 2010; Hedman & McDonnell, 2011; 
Tembo et al., 2007; Scanteam, 2008; COM, 2002). In this sub-section, we will provide a brief 
overview of the main findings of these reviews9. Before focusing on CSO support mechanisms, 
we will address the changes in the donor-CSOs relationship and its implications. 
2.2.1 General trends in donor-CSO relations
Throughout the international development arena, CSOs are increasingly involved in a structural 
dialogue with donors. In some cases this process has been institutionalised, as by the EU, while 
in others, it has been on an ad hoc basis (Structured Dialogue, 2011: Hedman & McDonnell, 
2011)10. The financial flows to and through CSOs have also risen gradually over the last few 
decades (Hedman & McDonnell, 2011). More recently, there has been a contrary trend in some 
countries, such as the UK, the Netherlands, Ireland, and Spain, where the financial downturn and 
a more critical attitude towards CSOs have resulted in budget cuts.
We will address the following issues relating to the enhanced recognition of CSOs: the selectivity 
of donors towards CSOs, direct versus indirect support, the choice of intermediaries, and lastly, 
the independency of CSOs. 
2.2.1.1 Donor selectivity towards CSOs 
Historically, donors have preferred to support domestic or international development NGOs rather 
than other CSOs, such as TUs, smaller or Southern NGOs, or advocacy groups11. There are 
multiple reasons for this preference. First, donors have preferred to support domestic NGOs 
because of their ties with civil society or with political groups in the donor country. Second, 
for a range of practical reasons (language, culture, and proximity) domestic NGOs have had 
a structural advantage in their home countries. Third, international and national NGOs have 
undergone a specialization process over time where project management is concerned, and 
have therefore often acquired better management capacities, which were assumed to lead to 
higher efficiency and effectiveness. Furthermore, increasing accountability requirements could 
also be met more easily through these well-established organisations. Accordingly, at the 
9 CSOs also raise significant amounts of funds independently. Worthington and Pippa (2010) assert that the non-profit sector in 14 
countries amounted to a total of USD 49 billion in 2008 (Hedman & McDonnell, 2001: 11). However, this report will focus on the fund-
ing of CSOs, and more specifically of TUs, by back-donors.
10 Although the institutionalisation of dialogue mechanisms with CSOs has been an important principle set out by the European 
Commission (2002), the European Court of Auditors (2009) finds that involvement is often more ad hoc. As a response, the EC started 
the aforementioned process of Structured Dialogue with a broad group of CSOs, in order to rethink CSO involvement, improve its 
effectiveness, and adapt EC procedures on development cooperation.
11 This report makes a distinction between domestic NGOs, which are NGOs based in developed and/or donor countries; international NGOs, 
which have an international membership that is represented in decision-making; and local NGOs, which are NGOs based in developing 
countries. In reality, these NGOs may overlap: international NGOs are often, but not necessarily based in developed and/or donor countries. 
Likewise, domestic NGOs may apply mechanisms that involve them in the decision-making process of their partners in developing countries. 
Furthermore, although the term NGO could be understood as encompassing everything that is “non-governmental”; we understand it from a 
practical perspective as development NGO. Although TUs have development activities, they do not belong to this group.
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European level, the European Court of Auditors (2009) found a significant difference between 
the involvement of European CSOs, such as Concord, and that of Southern CSOs. A fourth 
reason is the emphasis placed by most donors on CSOs’ service-delivery role (Scanteam, 2008: 
Hedman & McDonnell, 2011; Giffen & Judge, 2010). Hedman and McDonnell (2011) mention 
that five times more funds are channelled through domestic NGOs, based in DAC member 
countries, than to international and local NGOs12.This historical trend of funding domestic NGOs 
is getting less pronounced in some countries, as described by Giffen and Judge (2010: 8), who 
argue that donors are gaining more interest in funding Southern NGOs directly. However, up to 
now, funding patterns are still pre-dominantly in favour of domestic NGOs (Giffen & Judge, 2010; 
Hedman & McDonnell, 2011). 
2.2.1.2 Direct versus indirect support
The discussion also touches on the issue of direct versus indirect support. Direct support means 
that “the donor transfers funds directly to the implementing CSO in the South” (Scanteam, 
2008: 20). Indirect support, on the other hand, implies that “an intermediary agent manages 
the funds and CSO relations based on a formal agreement” (Scanteam, 2008:  21). These 
intermediary agents can be umbrella CSOs, private firms, or local government institutions, etc. 
According to the Scanteam (2008) study, there is a trend towards the use of intermediaries. This 
trend is somehow in contradiction to the evidence provided by Giffen and Judge (2010: 5-6), 
which confirms a shift towards more direct support of Southern CSOs. At present, donors are 
pushing for more direct support, as it is claimed that such support decreases transaction costs 
and simplifies accountability. There are both benefits and risks linked to indirect support. The 
main benefits of working through intermediaries, according to the Scanteam report (2008), 
are that this method increases the outreach capacity of support mechanisms and decreases 
transaction costs, which are henceforth borne by the intermediary actors rather than by the 
donors. It also makes it easier to harmonise and align support, which in turn makes results-
based management a less cumbersome endeavour (Scanteam, 2008).
2.2.1.3 Intermediary structures
One problematic aspect, according to Giffen and Judge (2010: 18), is the choice of intermediary. 
The main decision factor should be the legitimacy of the intermediary actor within local civil 
society. Although many donors want to strengthen local CSOs, in order not to work exclusively 
through domestic or international NGOs, support is seldom given directly to local CSOs. Four 
intermediary channels are mentioned by Giffen and Judge (2010), including through an embassy 
or country office, through partner country governments, through national NGOs in DAC countries, 
or through national NGOs on the ground (Giffen & Judge, 2010: 19). However, Giffen and Judge 
(2010) do not mention one of the most important intermediary channels for TUs, namely the ITUC 
and the GUF and their regional structures, as well as multilateral organisations such as the ILO 
12 In the OECD-DAC database, international and local NGOs (in developing countries) are placed in one category. A separate category 
for local NGOs will be created as a result of this report (Hedman & McDonnell, 2011: 19).
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or the UNDP. The Scanteam report (2008) also chides donors for neglecting the importance of 
selecting intermediaries that have legitimacy within the broader civil society in recipient countries. 
At present, the majority of intermediaries are international NGOs or national NGOs, which is not 
always beneficial to the development of civil society in developing countries (Scanteam, 2008). 
On the other hand, working directly through local CSOs is not always the preferred option, 
because direct support from foreign governments can undermine the legitimacy of political 
CSOs or CSOs which work in other sensitive areas. According to Hedman and McDonnell (2011), 
20 out of 24 DAC members actually provide direct support to local CSOs. However, the amount 
of support provided is unknown.
2.2.1.4 Increased recognition versus decreased independency
The increased recognition of CSOs and the translation of that recognition into higher levels 
of government funding have both positive and negative consequences. On the one hand, an 
increased financial input enhances CSOs’ capacity to deliver basic services, and helps strengthen 
civil society in developing countries. On the other, it also leads to increased dependency on 
governmental donors, and to larger incentives to adjust to donor priorities as a result. This 
adjustment sometimes occurs at the cost of the CSOs’ own flexibility and autonomy (Scanteam, 
2008). This potential loss of autonomy may also affect the role of CSOs as watchdogs, and as 
actors that enforce donors’ accountability (OECD-DAC, 2011).
In addition, there seems to be an inconsistency between donors’ rhetoric and the development 
on the ground. Donors support the strengthening of a ‘vibrant and diverse civil society’; however, 
there is a growing tendency to use CSOs as their programme contractors out of effectiveness 
and efficiency concerns. In general, CSOs are too often viewed as service providers, and not as 
advocates for change (Scanteam, 2008; Edwards & Hulme, 1996). In Hedman and McDonnell’s 
(2011) study of OECD-DAC members and of support for CSOs, this government perspective was 
indirectly confirmed by the fact that DAC members mention the following features as CSOs’ 
most important features: their proximity to beneficiaries, their ability to provide humanitarian 
assistance quickly, and their capacity to provide support in vulnerable countries and difficult 
situations (Hedman & McDonnell, 2011: 17). The features mentioned primarily refer to CSOs in 
their role of service providers. Therefore, although CSOs continue to be recognised as important 
actors in development, donors have increasingly incorporated them into their development 
agenda, with a growing risk of instrumentalisation. 
It seems that the attitude towards CSOs within the donor community has changed, and that 
funding schemes have gradually been made available to other types of CSOs. However, in 
practice, many back-donors approach the funding of CSOs rather instrumentally. As long as 
CSOs fit into their development agenda and can meet their accountability needs, they are 
supported. In reality, this often implies that service-oriented NGOs are favoured (Pratt, 2009). 
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2.2.2 Focus on CSOs’ support mechanisms
2.2.2.1 Which procedures are used by donors?
a)  A shift towards programme support? 
There is a trend towards more programme support13 instead of project support in donors’ rhetoric. 
However, when we take the actual numbers into account, it is clear that most funds are earmarked 
for specific projects14 (Giffen & Judge, 2010; Scanteam, 2008; Hedman & McDonnell, 2011). The 
term programme support can also be misleading, as most CSOs still have to specify the projects 
that they will implement within the programme, which implies de facto support for projects. In 
Hedman and McDonnell’s study (2011: 22), it is argued that the choice of support mechanism 
should be based on the donor’s specific development aims. This is a donor-centred point of view, 
and risks neglecting the specific needs, purposes, and perspectives of CSOs. However, as shown 
in the Scanteam report (2008), support mechanisms continue to be mainly donor-driven, with 
little consideration for the nature of the CSOs that they are designed for. For example, from CSOs’ 
point of view, programme support can be especially helpful for advocacy CSOs, as they have an 
even greater need for flexibility in a fast-changing policy environment. These organisations tend 
to receive less programme or core funding than large service-delivery NGOs for instance, which 
often have a higher management capacity and  a smaller need for flexible support mechanisms 
(Scanteam, 2008; Hedman & McDonnell, 2011; Giffen & Judge, 2010).
b) Framework and/or partnership agreements
Donors, like the UK, Belgium, and Denmark, are increasingly using framework agreements. 
However, these agreements are only accessible to CSOs with a certain absorption capacity, 
which are once again large development or service-oriented NGOs (Scanteam, 2008; Giffen & 
Judge, 2010). Some TUs also have framework agreements, as will be discussed later. The benefit 
of these agreements is the level of predictability and stability that they create. In some cases, 
they create more freedom, as in the case of Denmark. In others, the eligibility requirements are 
so strict that, in practice, CSOs cannot operate according to their own priorities, as is the case in 
Australia (Hedman & McDonnell, 2011). 
c) Tender process
A parallel trend is the increased use of tenders as an instrument for disbursing funds to CSOs. 
In 2010, 20 out of 24 DAC members stated that they had used this type of funding mechanism 
(Hedman & McDonnell, 2011: 23). Moreover, the European Commission is heavily dependent on 
tendering processes for channelling funds to CSOs (European Court of Auditors, 2009). This is 
13 Project support is funding earmarked for specific projects or activities. Programme support is funding for a programme), which usually 
has a longer term perspective and provides more flexibility as it is based on outcomes and not activities. Core support is one step further 
in the CSO autonomy ladder, as the CSOs in question can use the funding as they see fit. The reports do not always make clear distinctions 
in their definitions. For instance, Scanteam (2008) confuses programme and core support, although they are different funding procedures.
14 Scanteam (2008: 24) has stated that two-thirds of all the funding identified in their study was project funding. Hedman and Mcdonnell 
(2011: 20) mention that project and/or earmarked funding increased between 2001 and 2009 while core funding has remained at a 
relatively stable level since 2001. 
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another illustration of how the New Public Management (NPM) agenda is gradually permeating 
into the development field. The competition that has been introduced is assumed to ensure better 
value for money for the donor, and to lead to more innovation (Hedman & McDonnell, 2011: 23). 
There are, however, many disadvantages for CSOs where this type of funding mechanism is 
concerned, as it reduces CSOs’ autonomy and flexibility, and cooperation between them (Koch, 
2009 and European Commission, 2010 in Hedman). Many CSOs are critical of this type of funding 
mechanism, as it undermines any form of ownership, especially at the local level. Indications that it 
has a detrimental effect on TUs will be discussed in more detail in the next section. 
d) Self-funding
A final relevant issue in this context are the support mechanism conditions for self-funding 
by CSOs. Whilst there are good arguments for encouraging co-funding, as it can increase 
ownership and make CSOs less dependent on donor funds (Hedman & McDonnell, 2011: 30), 
it is important to take the different contexts in which CSOs work into account. On that basis, the 
amount of co-funding should vary; in reality, however, it is often linked to the degree to which the 
donor subscribes to the development agenda (Hedman & McDonnell, 2011: 26). 
2.2.2.2 What conditions are linked to support mechanisms?
Generally speaking, donors have increased their control over CSOs. Their enhanced responsibilities 
have been accompanied by an increase in PCM requirements, based on the NPM paradigm 
(Clayton et al., 2000). For instance, an external audit in the Netherlands concluded that the new 
co-financing system has raised administrative pressure to an unnecessary high level (Zijlstra, 
2011:  12). Likewise, in the case of the European Commission’s Development Cooperation, 
procedures are viewed as cumbersome. However, the Commission, working together with 
Concord, has launched initiatives to simplify these procedures, forms, and documents (European 
Court of Auditors, 2009).
This trend has been influenced by more instrumental views of CSOs, which arose in the context 
of the Paris Declaration. Pratt (2009: 1) argues that donors have adopted a narrow interpretation 
of effectiveness and that results-driven frameworks have not been adjusted for the diversity that 
exists within the civil society community. Unfortunately, the studies included in the published 
research limit themselves to the analysis of PCM requirements, and hardly mention other 
conditions of a geographical or thematic nature. 
a) PCM requirements
Hedman and McDonnell (2011: 32) have discussed donors’ M&E requirements. In this report, 
M&E requirements are understood as the conditions set by the donor for the monitoring and 
evaluation of programmes, and for reporting on them.
CSOs generally perceive the reporting requirements to be complicated. Four-fifths of DAC 
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members require CSOs to report according to a pre-determined format, which becomes 
problematic when CSOs have several sources of funding that each have their own format. It would 
make things much easier if donors would accept each other’s reporting formats, something that 
is rather exceptional at present (Hedman and McDonnell, 2011: 32). 
According to the OECD-DAC report (2011), M&E requirements are overwhelmingly introduced 
in a top-down manner by donors. Nonetheless, studies have pointed out that the involvement of 
implementing agents may substantially increase their use and ownership. (Hedman & McDonnell, 
2011: 33-34). 
Other donor priorities that relate to a results-based management agenda are the strong drive 
for upward accountability to the donors’ government constituency and the extensive focus on 
development effectiveness15. Donors tend to prefer results that can be translated into quantitative 
indicators, and can be aggregated across programmes and countries. Many CSOs argue against 
the feasibility of this process, and do not adhere to this linear perception of social development, 
arguing that it has negative implications (Zijlstra, 2011: 14). Natsios (2010: 1) has described 
this phenomenon as follows:
‘The counter-bureaucracy ignores a central principle of development theory—that those 
development programmes that are most precisely and easily measured are the least 
transformational, and those programmes that are most transformational are the least 
measurable’.
Giffen and Judge (2010) also address the issue of monitoring impact, and the difficulties that 
this creates in the civil society sector. The Netherlands, Ireland, and the UK are mentioned as the 
donors who impose the most stringent requirements on CSOs in terms of impact measurement. 
The process is increasingly expected to be based on quasi-experimental research structures, 
including control groups, and before-and-after measurements, which are often combined with 
logical frameworks. This trend appears to be driven by a value-for-money approach, where 
accountability for tax payers’ money is key. The Scandinavian countries, especially, Norway, 
have adopted a more “Southward” accountability, which is ‘more focused on development 
outcomes at the country level in the South’, and as such reduces the need for detailed planning 
of measurable activities (Giffen  & Judge, 2010:  13). Pratt (2009:  1) emphasises that these 
obligations sometimes undermine CSOs’ diversity and autonomy. Unfortunately, according to 
Hedman and McDonnell (2011), just over half of DAC members engage in M&E-based funding 
capacity development projects (Hedman & McDonnell, 2011: 3435). 
Scanteam (2008) adopts an interesting approach to this discussion, by questioning whether 
15 According to an OECD background report (2001: 6) results-based management can be defined as a broad management strategy 
aimed at achieving significant changes in the way government agencies operate, where improving performance (achieving better 
results) is the central focus. Results-based measurement is derived from this strategy; it is defined as the generation or supply of per-
formance information, and is focused on the technical aspects of clarifying goals, developing indicators, and of collecting and analysing 
results data (OECD, 2001: 6).
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donors also take downward accountability into account in their managing-for-results approach. 
In fact, Scanteam has questioned whether ‘CSOs are allowed to stay accountable to their 
own constituencies and retain their legitimacy and integrity as representatives of civil society’ 
(Scanteam, 2008: 37).
To conclude, studies show that there is a divergence between a positive trend in terms of 
the recognition of CSOs as important actors, and a negative trend in terms of the increased 
top-down control imposed on them. Although this control is based on increased concerns 
regarding development effectiveness, the support mechanisms and related requirements are 
based on donor-driven definitions of the term (Pratt, 2009). Donors lack understanding of how 
CSOs operate, of the diversity of the sector, and of the implications of their frameworks for the 
programmes that CSOs would like to implement. Some countries, such as Denmark, have tried 
to involve CSOs in drawing up their CSO policies. However, some of the studies question whether 
the Paris Declaration principles’ emphasis on harmonisation has actually undermined these 
efforts (Pratt, 2009).
3. The dynamics of donor support mechanisms for  
trade unions involved in development cooperation:  
what does the data tell us?
This section discusses the findings of our research on TU support mechanisms. As indicated 
above, it is based on primary research data generated by a series of interviews, a web survey, 
and by an extensive review of documents and studies. This process has enabled us to analyse the 
support mechanisms for 25 TUs in 18 Northern countries, namely, the United States, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Italy, France, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Spain, 
Portugal, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Japan, Australia, Germany and Ireland.
3.1 Mapping donor support mechanisms for TUs involved in development 
cooperation
The section begins by examining the sources of funding, and continues with a discussion of the 
various funding modalities used by back-donors. The issue of direct back-donor support for local 
TUs will be examined, as will the way in which Northern TUs support their local partners. 
3.1.1 Sources of funding
3.1.1.1 Dependency on government funding
Northern governments are the largest funders of TU development work (see table 1.2). The 
majority of TUs interviewed stated that the largest portion of their budget is financed by their 
respective governments. Among the 18 TUs included this study, 10 were dependent on their 
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national government for two-thirds or more of their total budget. For many TUs, the percentage of 
government funding amounts to around 80, 90 or even 100%. This is the case in the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Finland, Norway, Luxembourg, Ireland, Portugal, Germany, and Spain. These figures 
have remained relatively constant between 2008 and 2011 (fluctuating between 56% and 59%). 
One group of organisations has a more diversified economic portfolio. The group includes 
organisations like Solidar in Switzerland, which rely on their national government for around one 
third of their funding. Likewise, ISCOS in Italy, JTUC-Rengo in Japan, and APHEDA in Australia 
have portfolios that are less dependent on government aid, which accounts for between 17% 
and 58% of their funding, depending on the year (2008-2011).
There is an additional group of TUs that are 100% self-financed. The CFDT in France did not 
receive any government funding between 2009 and 2011, due to a transitional period during 
which it re-launched its cooperation policy. This enabled the CFDT to safeguard its autonomy 
during this period. Likewise, the Swiss SGB differentiates between activities that are more or 
less political. The former are wholly self-financed through the Solifonds organisation. Other 
organisations, like ELA in Spain, have shifted towards a 100% self-funding model as a result of 
PCM requirements and conditions.
In some countries, funds are disbursed through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (e.g. in Finland 
and Denmark), through the Ministry of Development Cooperation (e.g. in the Netherlands) or 
through the respective technical development agencies (e.g. the DFID in the UK, SIDA in Sweden 
and NORAD in Norway). In France, responsibility for development cooperation shifted from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) two years ago. 
Trade unions were “forgotten” in this shift, and were not recognised as development actors and 
therefore eligible for co-funding during a two-year period, although the issue has now been 
resolved. The situation is different in the United States (US), as the main TU actor, Solidarity 
Centre, enjoys multiple sources of funding, the main ones being USAID, NED, and the State 
Department, which all apply their own funding terms and related requirements. 
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Table 3.2 Number of trade unions benefiting from a certain percentage of government 
funding (<33%; between 33% and 66%; >66%) for their total development cooperation 
budget during the period between 2008 and 2011
Unavoidably, dependency on governmental funding has implications for TUs. It is especially 
sensitive because of the political nature of much TU development work. Interviewees provided 
examples of how their work is sometimes exposed to the political preferences of the ruling 
party or coalition, or to ad hoc policy making. The influence of social-democratic or neo-liberal 
governments on TU development work is not as straightforward as one would expect. In the 
case of Australia, the arrival of a Labour government did result in a significant increase in the 
development budget for trade unions (from 12% to 43%). In the case of the TUC in the UK, the 
opposite has occurred. The shift from a Labour government towards a Conservative-led coalition 
resulted in a significant downturn in funding. However, the trend has not been as straightforward 
in other countries. In the Netherlands, cutbacks to TU support were more severe under a Left-
Wing government. Funding is heavily dependent on the priorities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
or Development Cooperation, and on the specific political context in which decisions are made. 
Respondents did state that this vulnerability may apply to all CSOs, as cutbacks in government 
funding are unpredictable for the entire sector (e.g. Ireland). 
The dependency of TUs on government funding is ambiguous. In some countries, such as 
Belgium, the development work of TUs is embedded in consolidated TU structures, where a 
certain percentage of membership fees are also reserved for development cooperation. This is 
also the case in Spain, where 0.7% of the membership fee goes directly towards the development 
programme. The concept is also being trialled in Luxembourg. On the other hand, TUs may be 
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more vulnerable, as they find it hard to raise money for their development activities among 
the general public. This finding has been confirmed by opinion polls on public support for TUs 
as development actors in Belgium and the Netherlands (Pollet, 2010, 2012). In comparison, 
NGOs tend to have access to additional sources of funding (such as campaigning), although 
their dependency on government funding has also increased over the past few decades. The 
difference with NGOs has been material in the case of Australia, where NGOs have gained more 
access to external funding (mainly by means of public campaigns). Some respondents viewed 
this trend as increasing competition for the financial aid provided by the general public. 
Box 1 illustrates this high dependency on government funding, and points to the need for a 
diversification of funding sources. The US case, however, shows that the diversification of 
funding sources demands a significant time investment, which is pushing the Solidarity Center 
towards becoming more of a grant-issuing organisation, rather than dedicating its time to its 
core technical assistance activities. 
Framework agreements do not solve the dependency problem, but appear to provide more 
predictability for TUs. Belgium serves as an example in this regard. In specific countries, 
framework agreements have provided a more long-term perspective, and have reduced the 
influence of day-to-day politics (see Box 4). This has created a more stable environment for 
cooperation, and for the predictability of support mechanisms. A third way, suggested by the 
Trades Union Congress (TUC) in the UK is to increase the ability of Southern TUs to apply for 
funding themselves, so that they are no longer solely dependent on funds raised in the North. 
Box 1 The Trades Unions Congress (TUC)’s dependency on government  
funding in the UK
In the past, the TUC’s main source of external funding for its development work came 
from the DFID. However, the current agreement expired in March 2011, and a new 
application was rejected by the DFID. The funding guidelines have changed considerably 
under the new UK Government. Between 2009 and 2011, the TUC received funding 
through programme support; in addition, it could also apply for support through other 
funding channels. Under the new Government, the TUC can only apply for funding through 
one channel, and for project rather than programme funding. As a result, the TUC will 
not be able to count on any external funding for the coming year, and will be left solely 
dependent on its members’ contributions. This means that the TUC is now looking into 
alternative sources of funding, such as the EU, but primarily into domestic sources such as 
Comic Relief and the Big Lottery Fund. The TUC has had to learn the hard way that strong 
dependency on government funding can be highly detrimental, if there is no long-term 
outlook for the funding relationship. 
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3.1.1.2 Voluntary or compulsory self-funding
Governments demand a certain percentage of self-funding, which ranges between 10 and 25%, 
for the development programmes for which TUs apply for government funding. In some countries, 
this self-funding can take the form of the salaries paid to their own staff, and of administration 
costs, etc. ISCOS in Italy, Solifonds in Switzerland, and APHEDA in Australia are exceptions, 
as their level of self-funding is higher. It is difficult to get accurate figures, as these depend 
on the specific financing configuration for each organisation, i.e. whether membership fees 
are collected directly from members or indirectly through member TUs, for example. This self-
funding may be voluntary, as in cases where TUs make the choice to decrease their dependency 
on government funding, for instance, or compulsory. 
In Norway, the percentage of self-funding required for a project or programme depends on the 
degree to which it complies with the government development agenda. A programme can be 
100% supported by the back-donor if it is fully in line with their priorities. If not, a self-funded 
contribution of 10% is required. Likewise, the Luxembourg government demands a self-funded 
contribution of 15 to 20% when a project is aimed at one of the target countries identified. If not, 
the self-funded component is increased to 25%. 
3.1.1.3 EU budget grants: a cumbersome process
A third source of funding that was mentioned by some respondents was the EU. Although the 
International Trades Union Confederation (ITUC) has obtained EU funding for its international 
development network, this funding channel is hard to access for individual TUs. The EU does 
recognise TUs as development actors; in practice, however, obtaining support through its budget 
grants is perceived as very cumbersome16. This was also one of the findings in the European Court 
of Auditors’ report (2009) on the EC’s management of CSOs’ involvement in EC development 
cooperation. The administrative requirements were found to be so demanding that several TUs, 
such as FNV Mondiaal, decided that the time investment was too significant when compared to 
the uncertainty of actually receiving the funding. TUs also have to compete in the same funding 
pool as all the other CSOs, and in most cases the contest is won by those NGOs that are better 
resourced and have more capacity to invest in the application process. The competition is too 
fierce, especially for local TUs. In addition, the budget grants tend to undermine the bottom-
up planning approach used by TUs, because of the call-for-proposals process, which confines 
applications to a certain area, leaving little room for initiatives from local TUs.
16 ISCOS in Italy or the LO-FTF Council in Denmark have been exceptions because they were able to receive funds through EU budget 
grants. 
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3.1.2 Funding modalities
3.1.2.1 A shift towards programme support 
Some donors appear to be shifting towards programme support. There are, however, significant 
variations in TUs’ flexibility where managing these programmes is concerned. In the Scandinavian 
countries, especially Denmark, Finland and Norway, programme support offers the most freedom 
to TUs. They can switch between projects, and shift their attention from one country to another, 
if necessary, as long as the changes fall within the parameters of the overall programme 
implementation that was agreed upon with the Government. In Germany, programme support 
is also perceived as relatively flexible in terms of setting priorities. In Belgium, such support is 
perceived to be less flexible, because the programme projects must be specified in so much 
detail that flexibility gets lost along the way. For example, TUs must state which activities will 
be performed in each semester of each year in advance, while much of TUs’ development work 
involves exploring opportunities that emerge, and are often unforeseen. 
Many trade unions, however, find themselves in a project dynamic where they have to submit 
an application for funding every year, and where financing may change from year to year. This 
is the case for several TUs, including in those in Ireland, Luxembourg, Australia, the Netherlands 
and the UK.
Box 2 LO Norway’s programme support
LO, the Norwegian TU, receives programme funding for a period of four years, for a total 
of 10 different programmes, which are then divided into several projects. The support 
mechanism is perceived to be more flexible, as LO is no longer required to renegotiate 
the programmes every year. It only has to write short programme reports at the end of 
each year, specifying possible changes. In reality, NORAD no longer interferes in specific 
projects implemented by LO. LO is free to switch between the projects that it wants to 
support, or the countries in which it wants to operate. Nevertheless, these changes need 
to comply with the programme framework and must be shared with NORAD. The only 
drawback is that it is difficult to develop new thematic lines outside the programmes that 
have been agreed within the four-year programme cycles.
3.1.2.2 Flexibility
Flexibility is important for all CSOs but is even more essential in the case of TUs, as the field in 
which they operate is constantly influenced by external factors. For example, TUs have to be able 
to respond to immediate crises, if labour rights are being breached, or if restrictive labour laws 
or policies are introduced. The political character of their work is not as straightforward as that 
of many traditional service-delivery NGO projects. In addition, TUs also have their regular tasks 
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and daily routines to attend to, alongside the specific development activities that they support. 
The interviewees therefore argued that TUs need to have access to relatively flexible support 
mechanisms. Such access may be complemented by additional funding lines that can act as a 
buffer. For example, LO Norway has increased its ability to react to emerging crisis situations 
by creating a solidarity fund financed through membership fees, which is independent from 
government requirements and funding. Likewise, the Swiss SGB has a fund (Solifonds) that is 
dedicated to more political activities and is 100% self-funded.
3.1.2.3 Long-term outlook
Being able to adopt a long-term outlook is another vital factor for TU development work, and 
support mechanisms must take this into account. TUs focus on bringing about long-term and 
structural social change, while engaging strongly with their local partners. The underlying 
processes are complex, and require significant time to develop and evolve in the right direction. 
Strategic planning and predictability are required in order for the partnership to bear fruit. The 
shift towards programme support is a step in the right direction; however, the implicit project 
emphasis undermines TUs’ ability to work on a long-term basis. The programme support that 
the LO/FTF Council receives from the DANIDA (Danish International Development Agency) may 
be viewed as a good practice in this regard, as it has successfully negotiated a development 
outline and corresponding development plans up to 2015, and can extend that deadline to 2020. 
Another way to ensure a long-term perspective is to influence the government development 
agenda through various civil society involvement mechanisms. This is a way to ensure continuity, 
and to avoid ad hoc shifts in a government’s development policies, and consequently in those TU 
programmes that are dependent on government funding. 
3.1.2.4 Core funding
None of the TUs receive pure core funding17. Most respondents believed that it was unlikely 
that the back-donor would provide core funding for their activities. Some saw the advantages 
of stricter support mechanisms, because they can act as an incentive for both Northern and 
Southern TUs to become more focused, to think strategically, and to monitor the progress of their 
work on a more regular basis In summary, most TUs that receive programme support are happy 
with the mechanism as such, but would like to be able to implement long-term programmes, 
with more internal flexibility and a larger amount of financial support18. In fact, adding these 
features to the programme support process would mean moving to funding schemes that have 
some ingredients of core funding.
17 The Solidarity Center does receive a grant sum from the NED (National Endowment for Democracy), but it nonetheless has to provide 
an overview of the projects that it is going to implement.
18 One Belgian respondent was in favour of receiving core support, especially because the DGD uses it for its bilateral programmes. 
TUs are also responsible development actors, and they should be given the opportunity to prove this to the back-donor and to their 
constituency. 
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3.1.2.5 The negative impact of tendering processes
In parallel with the shift towards programme support, there are other countries that are moving 
in the opposite direction, such as the UK, the Netherlands, Italy, and the US. 
In Italy, TUs and CSOs usually receive project funding through a call-for-proposals scheme. The 
Government issues a call every year, and CSOs (including TUs) can apply for funding based 
on their own project proposals. In practice, TUs end up writing project proposals based on the 
Government’s wish-list, and on thematic areas, in order to stand a chance of receiving funding 
(see Box 6). The State Department in the US uses a similar approach; however, as there are 
multiple funding sources in the US, TUs can be selective when it comes to choosing the requests 
that correspond to their development strategy. 
In the UK, the situation is even worse, as the Government has adopted full-blown tender 
processes for the disbursement of funds to CSOs. DFID disburses funds to CSOs through a 
call-for-proposal procedure. This means that TUs have to compete with all CSOs to access 
funds. They are at a permanent disadvantage in this competition, since they are not as well 
equipped as many service- delivery or development NGOs, when it comes to complying with 
the DFID’s strict administrative requirements. The main reason for this disadvantage is the 
fact that TUs have limited staff resources working on development cooperation. This leaves 
fewer resources available for fund-raising activities, bidding, and administration, in comparison 
with large development NGOs. In the case of Luxembourg, limited administrative capacity has 
resulted in difficulties when it came to gathering the requested 15% self-funded contribution. 
In Scandinavian countries, TUs have been receiving ODA (Overseas Development Aid) for 
over 20  years, so they are more accustomed to these upward accountability requirements. 
Nevertheless, TUs have historically been more concerned with downward accountability, which 
partly explains their administrative shortcomings in terms of upward accountability. In the past, 
TUs in the UK were able to access funds through multiple funding schemes, now there is only 
one funding channel that they can apply for in competition with all other CSOs. This development 
has had a dramatic effect on the amount of funding received by TUs in the UK (see Box 1). 
Furthermore, in the Netherlands, the Government introduced a tender process for the 
disbursement of funding as from 2012. However, it is different to the UK process; there is a 
“targeted” bidding system in the Netherlands, which is intended solely for TUs (and not for other 
CSOs). This has resulted in a competition between two unions (the FNV and the CNV) for an 
earmarked budget, as described in Box 3. 
The tender processes adopted in the UK and the Netherlands, and project funding in Italy are 
described by the respondents as bad donor practices, as they work against the potential added-
value of TU development activities. The tenders or the criteria for project selection that are 
usually issued tend to be focused on service-delivery projects, with a short-term perspective, 
and inhibit TUs from working within their area of expertise, promoting the Decent Work Agenda, 
protecting labour rights, and from supporting TUs in creating tripartite structures in developing 
countries, etc. They also undermine long-term strategic planning, multilateral coordination, and 
the creation of a genuine partnership with local TUs. In addition, this type of support prevents 
TUs from working on a thematic basis across countries. Framework agreements that respect 
TUs’ specific characteristics as development actors, on the other hand, can be seen as good 
practices. 
3.1.2.6 The benefits of framework agreements
In some countries, such as Sweden, Belgium, Finland, Denmark, France and the Netherlands, 
TUs have partnership or framework agreements with the government19. These agreements 
can be specifically designed for TUs, as in Belgium and the Netherlands, or more generally 
for all major CSOs, as in Sweden, Finland and Denmark. The TUs that fall under a general 
CSO framework argue that working under one framework increases the chance of cooperation 
between different actors, if the TUs are part of the negotiations when the framework is designed, 
while enough emphasis can be placed on the framework to make it compatible with their 
development approach. The advantage of framework or partnership agreements is that they 
create stability in the relationship between the donor and the TUs. Within the framework, clear 
goals and responsibilities are outlined, which are binding on all parties, and based on mutually 
agreed guidelines. The agreements seldom entail detailed support mechanism procedures, but 
they do make it more difficult for the donor to impose ad hoc regulations or changes to the 
nature of the funding unilaterally. The German Friedrich Ebert Stiftung is a good example: it is 
recognised as a political foundation (with a strong social-democratic background, resulting in a 
significant emphasis on trade union work) through a legal framework that ensures stable funding 
over the years. 
19 An important nuance is the timeframe of the framework agreement. For instance in Sweden, the agreement needs to be renegoti-
ated together with the financial agreement, leading to more uncertainty in funding. 
Box 3 Introduction of a tender process in the Netherlands
FNV Mondiaal receives funding through a four-year programme support scheme. However, 
as of 2012, the two main TUs in The Netherlands, FNV Mondiaal and CNV, had to compete 
against each other in a tender process. While at the time of writing it was not yet clear if 
both organisations finally managed to secure funding, the tender process is a detrimental 
development, as it undermines the TUs’ autonomy, local ownership, and predictability in 
terms of funding and cooperation between the two TUs, and within international trade 
union development cooperation frameworks. Treating TUs, and any CSOs for that matter, 
as tendering organisations decreases the diversity and flexibility of development activities 
and overlooks the fact that CSOs are development actors in their own right, as specified 
by the AAA. 
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Most of the TUs that we interviewed mentioned the lack of knowledge about TU structures 
and development activities within government development departments. Including the TUs’ 
particular viewpoint on development issues within the framework could increase the general 
understanding of what they actually do and the value that they add, compared with other CSO 
efforts. 
However, this argument also holds true in the other direction. Many trade unions have only 
recently become active in the development cooperation field, which means that they lack the 
experience and professional scale to have access to framework agreement negotiations. In the 
case of France, for instance, organisations need to have a minimum budget of EUR 1.5 million to 
be able to apply for framework agreements. Size is also an issue in the case of Australia.
Box 4 The TU framework agreement in Belgium
In Belgium the three major TUs (the ACV-CSC, the ABVV-FGTB and the ACLVB-CGSLB) 
negotiated and signed an agreement with the Government in 2007, which provides for a 
five-year framework for TU development work. Under this agreement, each partner’s goals 
and responsibilities are clearly stated, as is the total amount of funding that the TUs can 
expect, and the way in which it will be divided among them. This framework can be used 
as a reference point during negotiations with the Government and is not subject to political 
volatility due its long timeframe. The Government is prevented from making unilateral 
decisions and has to discuss policy changes with the three TUs.
Italy is currently engaged in a process of creating a civil society framework for government 
funding, based on good practices in other countries. If this so-called “institutional table” 
succeeds, it would significantly improve the predictability of TU support, which is currently 
heavily influenced by the volatile political landscape in Italy. 
3.1.3 Decentralisation of support towards local TUs
In line with international trends towards decentralised cooperation, embassies from donor 
countries have been given more autonomy to support local CSOs. In general, the respondents 
stated that this has not yet systematically been the case for TU development activities, or has 
only been the case for limited budgets. One of the organisations that we interviewed described a 
limited “public relations budget” for the embassies. However, there are signs that this practice is 
in the pipeline at ministerial headquarters in some countries, while it is already the trend in the 
US. USAID channels a large part of its budget directly to organisations in the South, based on the 
argument that it enhances cost-effectiveness and sustainability (e.g. through the organisations 
executing the project management themselves). The UK, Ireland, and Germany also provide 
direct support to Southern CSOs. However, almost all TUs are opposed to this trend. 
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First, the political nature of TU activities makes direct back-donor support problematic. If a local 
TU is known to be supported directly by a Northern back-donor, its autonomy and legitimacy 
could be severely undermined. In Zimbabwe, for example, this has led to the oppression of some 
TUs, as they were perceived as Western puppets by the ruling party. Direct support for TUs could 
also be used as a political tool by the back-donor, in order to pursue their foreign policy, while 
overlooking the priorities of local TUs. Conversely, sensitive funding to TUs could be cut, out of 
concern for the business interests of companies from the donor country. 
In addition, many respondents mentioned the lack of TU know-how at embassy and government level. 
One respondent stated that only TUs can support other TUs, as their way of operating is so specific. 
TUs are also part of a larger international structure, and if all back-donors support TUs directly through 
their embassies, it will become increasingly difficult to create an international TU strategy. 
A final concern is the fact that local TUs will have to adhere to all the donor requirements that 
are currently met by Northern countries’ intermediaries. This could ultimately result in local TUs 
being driven by subsidy logic. They could end up becoming efficient recipients of aid, but stop 
focusing on their actual priority, namely, defending the rights of their members. 
3.1.4 How do TUs support their partners? 
Results on the issue of direct support versus support through intermediary mechanisms 
are ambiguous. In some countries, governments do not define the criteria for working with 
intermediary structures. This has been the case in Australia, Switzerland, Ireland, Germany 
and Luxembourg. However, the research noted that for some countries, there seems to be a 
shift from funding TUs in the South through international or regional TU structures, towards 
the renationalisation of TU support. This means an increased focus on direct funding from 
the Northern national TU to the Southern TU. This is remarkable because there seems to be 
international recognition that Northern TUs could be more effective if they pooled their support 
for the organisations that they support in the South. In addition, some labour rights issues are 
better dealt with at a regional or international level. The shift towards direct, bilateral funding 
seems to be driven by three factors20.
The first driver relates to questions around the value-added of intermediary organisations. Some 
Northern TUs believe that working with intermediaries, like GUFs, results in additional transaction 
costs, while working directly increases the negotiation room with local partners and, to a certain 
extent, control over those partners. The second driver results from the accountability agenda of 
the back-donors, who increasingly want to be able to see measurable results, which are found 
to be easier to demonstrate in one-to-one partnerships. Third, back-donor policies may force 
TUs to work directly with partners in developing countries, because a thematic approach across 
countries is not accepted. This is another illustration of the fact that back-donors tend to enforce 
practices in line with their own accountability concerns instead of taking into account what is 
actually the most beneficial way of operating.
20 Sweden is an exception, as the country still mainly supports international intermediaries such as the GUFs and the ITUC, despite 
criticism from SIDA regarding the amount of money going to Geneva and Brussels. 
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However, many respondents argued that, in the context of the global labour market, an approach 
that is coordinated at a regional or international level is more advisable. The LO/FTF Council, in 
Denmark, is an alternative example of how decisions regarding direct or indirect support can be 
made (see Box 5).
Box 5 The LO/FTF Council’s contextual analysis approach
The LO/FTF Council, a TU in Denmark, bases its decisions on whether to work directly or 
through intermediaries on a contextual analysis of every country. This contextual analysis 
aims to map the relevant (local, regional and international) TU organisations on the ground, 
and to assess the most appropriate partner for the specific project in mind. By adopting 
this approach the Council does not blindly adhere to donor wishes, or to transaction 
cost concerns. In contrast, the LO/FTF Council tries to take into account the best way of 
operating on the ground, in order to achieve the desired results. 
3.2 Compliance with governments’ development agendas
This section addresses the level of back-donor influence on the thematic and geographic 
orientation of TU projects and programmes. To what extent are TUs currently thematically and 
geographically restricted and what does this imply for the effectiveness of their development 
work?
3.2.1 Compliance with governments’ development agendas
In most countries, there is an implicit incentive to comply with the government development 
agenda, as it increases the funding possibilities for TUs. TUs are not always obliged to follow the 
agenda or thematic priorities exactly, but often end up aligning themselves with them in order 
to increase their chances of funding21. Such behaviour tends to be the case in countries with 
programme support mechanisms, such as Norway, Denmark and Belgium. The Spanish ELA calls 
this phenomenon a reformulation of their own priorities in a language that is more acceptable for 
governments (e.g. trade union support is formulated as ‘democratisation’ or training for trade 
union leaders as ‘professional training’). Likewise, in the case of Australia, trade union support 
or political work are not part of the government development agenda; therefore alternative ways 
are sought to support trade unions in the South, such as working on sexual harassment on the 
shop floor, or on the organisation of cooperatives, etc. 
Although there are no real thematic limitations in most countries, some TUs do find that they are 
implicitly pushed towards incorporating many additional cross-sector themes, such as gender 
equality, environmental issues, HIV/AIDS and other topics in all their programmes, although the 
opportunities to do so may differ greatly from project to project. Some TUs think that governments 
21 This does not mean that development actors follow the government agenda blindly or uncritically. There is still a margin for dialogue 
and criticism.
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Other TUs view complying with these back-donor conditions as less problematic, since they 
argue that these issues are important enough to be taken into account by every development 
actor. The Decent Work Agenda that has been developed and promoted by the ILO, and that is 
now generally accepted and promoted by the TU movement, has provided TUs with a sound 
framework in which to position additional government development priorities. From this 
perspective, the Decent Work Agenda enables TUs to adhere to government priorities without 
losing their own insight into these issues. Accordingly, in the case of Luxembourg, working 
on the issue of social dialogue in the South falls under the development agenda. In Germany, 
meanwhile, trade union work is recognised as essential to the democratisation process. This 
is also the case for the NED in the US, a foundation funded by the US Congress that supports 
democratization processes in the South, and recognizes the role of TUs therein.
A further step is the full recognition of non-governmental actors as complementary to the 
government’s approach. This has been the case in Switzerland, where development organisations 
have perceived that their Ministry is very open to giving direction to self- development 
programmes, without them having to comply with the government development agenda.
should not expect all CSOs to commit to all these issues, but suggest an actor-based approach, 
acknowledging that certain CSOs are better, for example, at integrating environmental issues, 
while others are better at supporting gender equality (see Box 7). 
In countries where tender processes or project funding has been introduced (the UK, the 
Netherlands, and the US), or where funding is dependent on EU calls for proposals, as in the case 
of ISCOS, in Italy, the requirement to comply with the government (or EU) development agenda 
is more explicit because the procedures include many specifications and conditions regarding 
what can and cannot be funded. In some cases, the tender and project support processes have 
forced TUs into a narrow service-delivery role that conflicts, to some extent, with the genuine 
nature of TU development work, which is concerned with much broader political and social 
issues (see Box 6). 
Box 6 Project support in Italy
The project funding mechanism in Italy has forced ISCOS into a service-delivery role. The 
Government has a conservative idea of development work, and mainly supports projects 
in the health and education field. ISCOS is required to draw up its project proposals in 
line with these priorities, in order to have any chance of receiving funding. ISCOS, like 
other TUs, has nonetheless managed to work around this limitation by describing their 
projects as vocational training activities, for example, although they are actually capacity 
development initiatives. Although effective, these TU survival strategies are not sustainable, 
and inhibit strategic planning.
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In cases where TUs have been involved in drawing up the development agenda, complying with 
the government agenda becomes less problematic. This has been the case in the Scandinavian 
countries or in France, where trade unions have been consulted regarding the drafting of the 
framework document on development cooperation (Coopération au développement: une vision 
française - 2011). Moreover, in the case of Luxembourg, trade unions, the private sector and the 
NGO sector participated alongside the ministries involved in Lux-Development, the Luxembourg 
agency for development cooperation. Likewise, the Australian government consulted a broad 
range of civil society organisations when reviewing its development policy. Meanwhile, the 
‘Consejo de Cooperación’ is the official participatory mechanism for channelling the opinions of 
Spanish civil society on its governmental development policy. Trade unions are not in the NGO 
group, but participate as separate category.
Consultation often takes place on more general terms, i.e. on long-term priorities rather than on 
more specific issues like implementation, reporting, or funding mechanisms.
3.2.2 Alternatives to the current practice
In response to most back-donors’ one-size-fits-all approach to CSOs, TUs would like to see a 
transition towards an actor-based approach to development cooperation. This implies recognising 
the particularities and added-value of different CSOs, and adapting support mechanisms in 
accordance with this diversity. An actor-based approach entails more than separate TU funding 
channels, as in Belgium and the Netherlands. The donor’s requirements and expectations should 
be adapted to the differences and specific features that exist within the large group of CSOs 
(TUDCN, 2011). 
TUs are relatively new actors in the development debate, compared with the more established 
NGOs. As a consequence, they are confronted with funding procedures that are primarily oriented 
towards the needs of specialised development NGOs. However, there is increasing recognition of 
the particular role that trade unions play in development. Trade unions have something to offer 
that often cannot be provided by NGOs. Whereas in some countries trade unions are recognised 
as essential actors in democratisation processes, in others it is precisely this more political nature 
that hampers their access to funding. Trade unions can rely on stable world-wide networks, which 
involve not only partners in the South, but also global and regional federations. Furthermore, the 
existence of an organisation like the International Labour Organisation, which is part of the United 
Nations and has a body of legal instruments at its disposal, is perceived as added-value that is 
contributed by the labour movement to international development cooperation. In addition, the 
expertise of trade unions regarding important development issues, such as social protection, 
informal employment, international trade integration, and governance, etc. should be recognised.
In some countries, like Switzerland or Portugal, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not the sole 
Ministry that has a budget for development cooperation; other ministries, such as the Ministries 
of the Economy or Labour also have budgets, and sometimes provide specific funding that 
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can be used for development-related activities. Where these more specific budget grants are 
concerned, trade unions may have an advantage compared with other NGOs. Furthermore, 
for the Ministry of Labour, complying with the government agenda is less of an issue. The 
importance of social dialogue, tripartism, or decent work is not questioned.
Finland can be seen as a good example where recognising the diversity of civil society is 
Box 7 Diversity of CSOs in Finland
In Finland, the diversity of civil society is recognised and applauded by the Government, 
and SASK is encouraged to be complementary to other CSOs in terms of their area of 
expertise. The Government does not encourage all CSOs to be active in the same fields 
and countries, but seeks to increase the impact of its development work by using diversity 
within civil society in an effective way. SASK’s expertise is respected, as TU development 
activities are almost entirely conducted through the organisation. In addition the donor has 
accepted its four main goals: organisational development, collective bargaining, ILO core 
labour standards and TUs as actors in civil society. These particularities are acknowledged 
by the Government and by other CSOs, which enables the forming of alliances based on 
mutually recognised complementarity. SASK has become a pioneer in forging effective 
alliances with other CSOs, based on a shared agenda, while representing different 
constituencies and using their specific area of expertise.
concerned (see Box 7).
3.2.3 Geographical limitations
Geographical conditions tend to pose even more problems for TUs than thematic ones22. There 
is a general trend towards limiting the number of countries in which CSOs that are funded by 
a specific donor are allowed to operate. These countries include many LDCs (Least Developed 
Countries) or fragile states, since the focus of many governments is on poverty reduction. In 
Denmark, there is a GNP ceiling, with which CSOs must comply (see Box 8). The emphasis 
on working in LDCs has implications for TU development activities. Generally, TU development 
projects require a certain level of economic momentum in order to have a positive impact, as 
they are based on redistribution mechanisms. One respondent used the following metaphor: “In 
order to divide a cake, one must have a cake, and in LDCs and fragile states, the cake simply 
is not there”. In line with recent concerns that 72% of the world’s poor live in middle-income 
22 Sweden and Germany are striking exceptions, where TUs do not face geographical restrictions.
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countries (MICs), it makes even less sense to restrict TUs to working in LDCs (Sumner, 2010). 
A framework agreement that entails a negotiated list of countries where TUs can operate could 
provide a solution for this problem. It would restrict the government from making unilateral 
decisions on this issue, and gives the TUs an opportunity to prove the importance of not only 
focusing on LDCs or fragile states. TUs should be perceived as complementary to the NGOs that 
focus on service delivery in the poorest countries. 
3.3 Assessing PCM requirements
3.3.1 The hegemony of logical frameworks
In all countries, except for the Netherlands and Australia in the recent past, and for some 
experimentation in Belgium, TUs use logical frameworks as a project-cycle management (PCM) 
tool. FNV Mondiaal uses outcome mapping as a PCM tool. Belgium is experimenting with outcome 
mapping, while in Australia, TUs are relatively free to develop their own PCM tools. For instance, 
Australia’s APHEDA enters into mutual agreements rather than donor-recipient agreements. The 
logical framework as such has been accepted by TUs, not with much enthusiasm, but rather 
as an instrument that can facilitate planning. Some TUs, like the LO/FTF Council in Denmark, 
genuinely think that it is good tool, which offers sufficient flexibility. Others, such as the ACLVB-
CGSLB in Belgium, are getting used to working with it, and are trying to make it work in their 
partners’ context. 
On the other hand, some TUs have criticised the blueprint approach that back-donors use where 
PCM requirements are concerned. The fact that most back-donors do not have any understanding 
of TU development work has implications for the PCM obligations that they impose. The long-
term outlook and complex nature of TU development activities is insufficiently recognised by the 
majority of donors. In the case of the German FES for instance, indicators have to be designed 
over a period of three years. As TUs work in fast-changing social and political environments, 
Box 8 GNP ceiling in Denmark
In Denmark, the implementation of development activities is subject to a GNP ceiling. 
For CSOs, this ceiling is higher than for government bilateral support, however it still 
poses problems. The GNP ceiling is an extremely relative poverty indicator, which does 
not take levels of inequality into account. One example mentioned by the LO/FTF Council 
respondent is the increase in Angola’s GNP following the discovery of oil, which led to the 
halting of LO/FTF Council projects in Angola. This halt is in contradiction with the need for 
strong TUs in Angola, which are more necessary than ever, as only 1% of the population 
is actually benefitting from the increase in GNP. This shows that, contrary to donor 
perceptions, TU activities in MICs are more effective, and in some ways more essential, as 
they act as a counter balance to the trend towards increased inequality.
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such a static model has its limits when reflecting the reality of a project. Likewise, Germany 
applies an obligatory bidding procedure for external contracting. In some cases, this creates 
additional administrative work without clear added-value. An overstated orientation towards 
results and impact assessment in a narrow technical sense might not be adequate for political 
activities and institutional partnerships.
In most countries, back-donors are unable to establish clear criteria regarding PCM requirements. 
In some cases, TUs would prefer to have clear and transparent criteria that provide more certainty 
on donor standards. Enjoying a misleading level of freedom, which is ultimately restricted by 
numerous amendments made by the donor, is counter-productive (see Box 9). In those cases 
where donors are more open to a diversity of PCM approaches, such flexibility is welcomed, 
as it gives TUs the autonomy to develop their own methods. A case in point is the Australian 
example, where the Government does not apply a fixed format, but accepts a PCM approach that 
Box 9 Unclear donor PCM requirements in Sweden
SIDA has required TUs to draw up a results matrix since 2009, but has failed to clearly 
state what kind of results matrix it specifically expects. When the TUs hand in their results 
matrix, based on their understanding of what it should entail, they may end up receiving it 
back because it is said not to meet SIDA’s standards. Therefore, clarifying the standards of 
the results matrix ex-ante would avoid organisations doing the same work twice.
is mutually agreed between trade unions and their partners in developing countries.
The study concludes that, overall, reporting obligations have gradually been relaxed in Scandinavian 
countries. Instead of having to write detailed project reports every year for all their projects, TUs 
have to write small programme reports, focusing on the changes that have occurred. This has been 
made possible by the implementation of stricter application formats, where TUs have to specify their 
aims in detail, and how they will achieve them. Most TUs prefer to write one substantive programme 
proposal that focuses on results, because it subsequently gives them more freedom to achieve these 
results, as back-donors do not follow up administratively on every single activity that they engage 
in. Compared with their Scandinavian partners, who are adopting a more results-based approach, 
Belgian back-donors still work with activity-oriented support mechanisms, despite theoretically 
claiming the opposite. 
FNV Mondiaal in the Netherlands is currently experimenting with outcome mapping as a PCM tool, as 
it feels that it is better equipped to capture social change processes. In the field of TU development 
work, activity A does not necessarily lead to activity B, while logical frameworks implicitly build 
on this assumption. For instance, it is difficult to track the impact of creating of a social dialogue 
structure on the financial situation and the broader livelihoods of its workers in a country. This is 
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due to the existence of multiple external factors that affect the social dialogue dynamic, together 
with a range of factors influencing the livelihoods of workers. It seems as though some TUs are 
Box 10 Open dialogue on PCM in Switzerland
“The challenge for us and our government is how to translate the developments of a 
cooperation programme into visible results for the public.” The Swiss Solidar organisation 
has entered into a dialogue with the Swiss Government, in order to share experience 
and instruments for measuring the impact of complex societal processes. It is not a kind 
of competition between approaches, nor is there any pressure or demands from the 
Government. Development organisations can use their own reporting formats. However, 
this engagement in open dialogue is the result of both civil society organisations and 
governments being confronted by the challenge of demonstrating results from complex 
processes like political work, campaigning, or trade union development.
not aware of alternative PCM approaches, and have left the logical framework unquestioned, 
possibly for compliance purposes. 
3.3.2 The quest for results
The most problematic issue in the field of PCM is the over-emphasis on, and the implementation 
of certain aspects of the results based-management agenda. The fact that measuring the 
impact of TU development activities is not straightforward lies at the heart of this problem. 
As indicated above, the issues of attribution and contribution pose methodological and ethical 
difficulties, while TU activities are affected by many external factors, which can make showing 
the genuine impact of an activity problematic. In most countries, back-donors tend to prefer 
quantitative results indicators, which are even more difficult to design if they have to capture 
the genuine impact of a project (see Box 10). In addition, donors increasingly desire short-term 
results indicators for accountability reasons, which runs counter to the long-term outlook of 
most TU initiatives. 
In addition, trade unions often work on complex societal phenomena such as democratisation, 
the strengthening of civil society, or political projects that are often difficult to express in terms 
of quantitative indicators. Some TUs try to illustrate the impact of complex societal problems by 
not only including qualitative indicators, but also by providing detailed narratives of how their 
programmes are impacting on the lives of workers. 
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Some TUs, however, stressed the fact that this phenomenon is not limited to the field of TU 
development work, but that all CSOs have to deal with these obligations. Human rights advocacy 
groups might even find living up to the donor’s expectations more difficult than TUs.
3.3.2.1 The implications of these requirements for local TUs and TU 
activities on the ground
The RBM requirements are even more burdensome for local TUs, as they often lack the capacity 
to comply with these increasingly stringent obligations. In extreme cases, local TUs increasingly 
have to dedicate more time to trying to fulfil the administrative wishes of back-donors, thereby 
diverting their attention from the correct implementation of their projects. To support their 
partners, Northern TUs are forced to invest more attention in building M&E capacity than in core 
TU activities.
However, the study notes that there are several initiatives within the TU movement aimed at 
dealing with the increasing demands to demonstrate results at an international level, in order to 
avoid putting the full burden solely on their partners in the field. For example, TUs are trying to 
create generic TU impact indicators that can be used by their partners. One good practice from 
Denmark is the creation of a joint civil society working group that is trying to tackle the issue 
of how to report on the effects of the Danish Civil Society Strategy. At the international level, 
the TUDCN (ITUC) is also launching a process focusing on this area, with the aim of arriving at 
specific, appropriate, and contextualised measurements of outcomes and impact. 
3.3.2.2 The need for mutual learning structures
The research has pointed out that, while project management poses challenges to most TUs, 
some Northern and Southern TUs are more comfortable with PCM and RBM obligations than 
others. TUs that have experience of these issues do not take enough initiative in sharing best 
practices. Although examples of this kind of peer-to-peer cooperation effort have brought about 
positive results, TUs do not currently make enough use of them. Many TUs also emphasised 
Box 11 RBM requirements in France
In France, as well as in other countries, the impact has to be demonstrated in quantitative 
terms. Although the CFDT acknowledges that drawing up quantitative indictors can help in 
methodological terms, it sometimes tends to divert the focus from more important issues 
such as adequate project implementation. TUs’ actions are not always visible, and are less 
easy to quantify than the actions of humanitarian or service-delivery NGOs, for instance. 
For instance, the number of Collective Labour Agreements (CLAs) does not give an idea 
of the genuine impact of these agreements on workers’ livelihoods. The difficulty that TUs 
have in measuring their impact is a key concern.  
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the importance of working together with NGOs on these issues, as they are generally more 
experienced with such RBM requirements. Generally speaking, TUs have acknowledged the 
need to become more specialized development actors, and an important phase in this transition 
is increased cooperation between various CSOs. In Switzerland, this concept of peer-to-peer 
cooperation is taking shape through the promotion of networking and working through consortia. 
Another interesting experience is that of Luxembourg, where the development NGO platform 
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screens the projects that are presented to the Government for funding. When a project meets 
government standards, it receives a certificate of compliance. In other words, this is an internal 
peer review system, which appears to be a good way of exchanging professional skills among 
the development actors involved.
Conclusions
Generally speaking, back-donors have become more open towards TUs as development actors. 
The extent to which this sentiment has been translated into practice varies, as back-donors are 
not homogenous entities, and different practices and relationships towards TUs might exist in 
parallel even within the same agency.
Development ministries are increasingly open to the recognition of TUs as development actors. 
In some cases, however, like in the UK, this is still a controversial issue. In others, in contrast, 
the donor agency has acted as a buffer between the stricter requirements of a ministry and the 
TUs, as in the case of the SIDA. 
There is also a dichotomy between the increased recognition of TUs as development actors, 
exemplified by the fact that they are now part of ministry consultation processes, and the 
increasingly strict controls imposed on them. The consequences of the political nature of TU 
development work and its implications for support mechanisms should not be underestimated. 
However, as discussed in the second section, the streamlined, one-size-fits-all nature of the 
funding procedures is a general trend where support mechanisms for CSOs are concerned. The 
specific features of TU development work are therefore not sufficiently recognised. Ultimately, 
the relationship remains that of a donor and a recipient, with the former often having the final 
word in decision-making. This unilateralism is accepted by some TUs, but frustrates many 
others. TUs have mentioned the fact that the priorities of the governing party affect the nature 
of their funding. For instance, in Denmark in 2003, the LO/FTF Council lost all of its funding, 
and had to renegotiate its status, in order to finally receive programme support in 2008. The 
Conservative-led government coalition in the UK has developed funding regulations which are 
less appropriate for TUs than those of the previous Labour Government. In Sweden, the impact 
of changes in government has been mitigated by the fact that the staff and policies at the SIDA 
have remained the same, which has resulted in a certain degree of consistency in TU policies. 
In some cases, like in Norway, the effect is limited to a decrease in political leverage. In other 
countries, like in the Netherlands, the effect has been felt both at the financial and political level. 
The conclusions of our study are that a more institutionalised, long-term TU strategy is to be 
preferred. A framework agreement, which is one description, addresses many of problems that 
are currently identified among the negative donor practices towards TUs.
In the first place, it creates a stable environment for cooperation, based on mutually agreed 
responsibilities and obligations. In addition, it enhances the predictability of the funding amount, 
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period, and criteria. TUs can also use the framework agreement as leverage in negotiations 
with the donor, as it serves as a platform for different opinions on development. If a donor 
wants to impose changes that run counter prior agreements, CSOs and/or TUs can refer to the 
strategy as a legitimate argument against top-down decision-making. Generally speaking, the 
most important advantage of a framework agreement is that it restricts governments’ ability 
to make unilateral decisions. We should, however, be aware, that vague agreements still leave 
room for donors to impose top-down decisions, as argued by Pratt (2009); therefore clear and 
well-defined responsibilities need to be enunciated. 
Depending on the specific country context, a CSO strategy or a specific TU strategy may be more 
suitable. In Denmark, TUs are recognised as development actors in their own right within the 
civil society community. In this case, establishing a joint agreement is advisable, as it increases 
cooperation and leverage.
The process entry point for creating such a framework should be an actor-based approach 
to development (TUDCN, 2011). Although TUs have been recognised as development actors 
in all the countries where we interviewed respondents, this theoretical recognition has not 
been implemented in the support mechanisms used by donors. TUs fall within the broad 
category of CSOs, and are subject to the same requirements as other CSOs. However, TUs are 
specific development actors, and have mentioned the following particularities and comparative 
advantages:
l TUs are membership-based organisations with a democratic structure. This implies that 
they have built in bottom-up accountability mechanisms, which are less structurally present 
among traditional NGOs;
l they have country-wide representation and can implement projects on a nationwide scale. 
Most NGOs find it hard to achieve such a broad geographical scope;
l they also play an important role in society, via their participation in the social dialogue, both 
with government and with the private sector. This involves an important awareness-raising 
role, both in the North and South;
l they are key participants in the functioning of the labour market and of the economy, 
which are major development drivers;
l the workplace is a key development factor, but it is also a place where many abuses occur, 
and TUs are well suited to tackle these issues;
l in line with the increased involvement of the private sector in development, TUs must also 
play an important role in ensuring corporate social ‘accountability’, which protects the rights 
of workers and not just those of business;
l they are embedded in an international social solidarity framework, in which every TU has an 
equal voice. This is reflected in the international architecture of trade unions, which involves 
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various regional and global representative bodies (like the Trade Union Confederation of the 
Americas, and the International Trade Union Confederation, etc.);
l trade unions can rely on a large body of international legislation, and on an institutional 
framework like the ILO, which is a United Nations specialist body. 
TUs should be seen as development actors in their own specific right, and should not be limited 
by the same uniform requirements for short-term impact indicators, geographical concentration 
and thematic focuses as for other CSOs. The TUs that we interviewed not only expressed the 
need for a separate funding channel, but stated that the CSO channel should become more 
flexible, in order to come to terms with a holistic understanding of civil society. 
A shift towards programme funding is positive; however, if the implicit emphasis on projects is 
maintained or enhanced, the trend could be towards de facto project funding, which has the 
potential to undermine the effectiveness of TU development work.
Recommendations
5.1 For donors
In this section, we present a number of recommendations, which can be understood as good 
donor principles towards TUs.
Recognising CSOs’ diversity and support complementarity
Not only should CSOs be seen as actors in their own right, as stipulated by the AAA, but there 
is also a need within the heterogeneous CSO community to treat TUs (and other CSOs) as 
distinctive actors in their own right. It is counter-productive to treat the CSO community as 
one homogeneous group. In line with this analysis, TUs have added-value in specific areas of 
work compared with other CSOs. Instead of trying to harmonise and focus CSOs’ development 
activities, their diversity should be embraced and supported. 
Providing programme support
Donors should respect the specific nature of TU development work, and should adjust their 
support mechanisms accordingly. As TUs operate in a complex field, and with a long-term 
outlook, support mechanisms should be as flexible as possible. Genuine programme support, 
and preferably core funding are the preferred funding methods for increasing the effectiveness 
of TU development cooperation. Project support, even when disguised as programme support, 
risks undermining some of the aims and potential results of TU development work. Calls for 
proposals, and other tender processes that result in strong competition between CSOs are even 
worse, as they not only undermine cooperation between TUs and CSOs in general, but also 
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primarily tend to favour specialised NGOs that are already well established. The European Court 
of Auditors’ report (2009) has also confirmed this trend.
Establishing framework agreements
Donors should view the use of framework agreements as a guarantee that their needs will be 
respected, together with those of TUs. If the framework agreements entail strict responsibilities 
and obligations for both sides, a relationship based on trust and respect should be established. 
In such an environment, donors should be able to release their grip on TUs and make room for 
more flexible support mechanisms, as advocated above.
Realising the limitations of a strict focus on LDCs
Donors have to realise that an exclusive focus on LDCs implies an under-use of TU’s potential 
and redistributive capacity. In line with the second recommendation, TUs should be seen as 
complementary to those NGOs that are focusing on the poorest countries. They should be 
recognised as development actors, who contribute to the mitigation of unsustainable inequality 
levels in MICs, a category that accounted for more than 70% of the world’s poor in 2007-2008 
(Sumner, 2010). Geographical conditions should preferably be decided in consultation with the 
civil society sector. 
Creating flexible PCM obligations
As Pratt (2009: 1) has argued, donors need to be aware, ‘that frameworks which emphasise 
one view of effectiveness may result in a loss of diversity and autonomy for civil society’. This 
statement refers to the increased emphasis on managing for results, as a way to increase 
development effectiveness. Although demonstrating results is essential, and is also recognised 
as such by TUs, an overly strict focus on these issues could actually undermine effectiveness, if 
the administrative burden, or the pressure to simplify project designs for the sake of measurability 
becomes exceedingly high. A better balance should be found between donor needs, based 
primarily on accountability concerns, and on what is actually beneficial for the programme on 
the ground.
5.2 For TUs
The study also raises a number of issues that TUs should consider, in order to work towards 
more effective support mechanisms. 
Becoming more proactive
Generally speaking, TUs should become more proactive in terms of emphasising their specific 
features and of stressing their priorities. The Decent Work Agenda could be used as a starting 
point in this respect. 
47
Being aware of compliance
In line with the previous recommendation, TUs should dare to challenge donor policies more 
systematically and openly, and should sometimes take the step of venturing into the unknown. 
Part of the TU community has had the tendency to stick to practices out of habit, instead of truly 
questioning which practices are in fact best suited to their needs. More experimentation with 
PCM instruments would be welcome. The experiences with alternative PCM approaches are an 
interesting experiment in this regard. Creative and innovative thinking among TUs should be 
enhanced. 
Enhancing mutual learning structures
There are divergences between TUs in terms of the level of professionalism with which they 
approach PCM and RBM requirements. TUs with greater expertise in these areas should take 
responsibility for sharing their experience with others. Mutual learning structures based on good 
practices and on the dissemination of information should be enhanced among Northern and 
Southern TUs. The working groups in Denmark, and the TUDCN could serve as examples. Equally, 
the open dialogue on PCM between civil society and the Swiss Government is a good example.
Enhancing cooperation with the private sector
It is essential that TUs take a proactive stance in the debate on the role of the private sector in 
development. As experts in the field of labour and economics, TUs are well placed to influence 
this debate, as they demand that attention be paid to redistribution and fair labour practices, and 
not just to economic growth.
Enhancing cooperation with other CSOs
In line with the previous recommendation, TUs should maintain and enhance the scope of 
cooperation with other members of CSOs. Mutual grounds and comparative advantages should 
be identified, and ideally, an institutionalised structure should be set up. 
Raising awareness of neglected issues
TUs are well suited to increasing awareness of global issues like unfair trade agreements, 
perverse agricultural policies, and migration, which are not receiving the attention they deserve, 
due to increased government control over their agenda.
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APPENDIx 1 Table showing TUs’ financial data
2008 2009 2010 2011
Amount of 
government 
funding in 
absolute 
amounts (EUR)
% of gov funding 
in your total 
budget for 
development 
cooperation
Own 
contributions 
used for 
development 
activities
Amount of 
government 
funding in 
absolute 
amounts (EUR
% of gov 
funding in 
your total 
budget for 
development 
cooperation
Own 
contributions 
used for 
development 
activities
Amount of 
government 
funding in 
absolute 
amounts (EUR
% of gov 
funding in 
your total 
budget for 
development 
cooperation
Own 
contributions 
used for 
development 
activities
Amount of 
government 
funding in 
absolute 
amounts (EUR)
% of gov 
funding in 
your total 
budget for 
development 
cooperation
Own 
contributions 
used for 
development 
activities
CDFT (France) 50,000 5% 262, 587 0 0 214,421 0 0 365, 104 0 0 432, 000
TUC (UK) 372,156 1,620,172 30%
1
70% 1,410,488 30% 70%
FNV Mondiaal 
(Netherlands)
15,522,000 92% 1,391,000
2
10,633,000 88% 1,464,000 10,633 85% 1,876,000 9,038,000 90% 1,029,000
ISCOS (Italy
3
) 413,352 17% 889,323 1,995,240 58,63% 833,532 727,347 30,70% 910,319 / / /
SASK (Finland) 3,560,000 85% 628,000 4,742,000 84% 851,000 
(16%)
4,948,000 82% 1,055,000 
(18%)
4,530,000 81% 1,131,000 
(19%)
LO (Norway) 387,480 90% 38,748 387,480 90% 38,748 426,179 90% 42,618 426,179 90% 42,618
ELA (Spain) 0 0% 58,681 0 0% 83,397 0 0% 85,622 0 0% 89,388
LCGB 
(Luxembourg)
21,250 85% 3,750 21,250 85% 3,750 4,250 85% 750 4,250 85% 750
OGBL 
(Luxembourg
4
)
/ / / 748,800 66% + 4% 360,000 748,800 66% + 4% 360,000 748,800 66% + 4% 360,000
SGB 
(Switzerland)
Solifonds
0 0% 509,000 0 0% 550,000 0 0% 533,000 0 0% 534,000
Solidar
(Switzerland
5
)
4,000,000 33% 0 4,000,000 33% 0 4,000,000 33% 0 4,000,000 33% 0
APHEDA
(Australia)
574,000 12% 4,669,000 1,855,000 43% 2,510,000 1,905,000 36% 3,440,000 2,965,000 46% 3,550,000
ICTU
(Ireland
6
)
88,000 87% 11,000 88,000 87% 11,000 88,000 87% 11,000 65,000 87% 8,450
Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung
(Germany
7
)
75,000 97% 2,250 80,000 97% 2,400 80,000 97% 2,400 / / /
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Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung
(Germany
7
)
75,000 97% 2,250 80,000 97% 2,400 80,000 97% 2,400 / / /
JTUC-Rengo
(Japan)
7,000,000 18% 2,000,000 6,700,000 19% 1,900,000 6,200,000 20% 2,000,000 5,700,000 20% 2,600,000
DGB-
Bildungswerk
(Germany
8
)
2,379,626 95% 124,303 2,671,811 95% 135,989 2,882,767 96% 134,512 2,795,847 94% 166,611
UGT-P
(Portugal
9
)
90,000 100% 0 70,000 100% 0 105,000 100% 0 107,000 100% 0
Iscod
(Spain
10
)
2,930,000 36% 644,950 3,883,800 40% 600,000 3,875,000 43% 600,000 4,693,000 55% 650,000
CCOO
(Spain)
2,091,553 80% 397,334 3,172,500 80% 348,697 3,172,500 80% 369,981 3,172,500 80% 383,180
1 The TUC does not provide specific financial data for development activities, but only for all international activities.
2 Equivalent to the solidarity funds of FNV trade unions.
3 ISCOS has two additional sources of funding. First, EU budget grants, which provided 47%, 87%, 14.54%, and 24.31% of its budget in 2008, 2009, and 2010 respectively. Second, ISCOS is one of the potential beneficiaries of the 5x1,000 budget, which is an 
amount of tax-payers’ money distributed by the Government. 
4 Figures are rough estimates. The calculation is as follows. OGBL Solidarité Syndicale has two main projects, for which 2/3rds of the financing is provided by the by the Luxembourg Government. The Government also assists with the administration costs, for an 
amount equivalent to 4% of the total budget that has been received by the Government.
5 In rough terms, Solidar receives 1/3rd of its budget from the Swiss government, 1/3rd from other institutional donors, and 1/3rd from individual donations.
6 Figures are a rough estimate, and are calculated as follows: the ICTU has two development lines: one for the development of education in Northern countries, where the total budget between 2008 and 2011 was €265,000, 87% of which was financed by IrishAid. 
A second development line is development cooperation in the South, which is 100% financed by the ICTU. These are more irregular projects, because of which it is difficult to calculate the exact budget.
7 FES received €130,000,000, €139,000,000 and €132,000,000 in 2008, 2009 and 2010; around 55% of that amount was directed towards development cooperation. In addition, around 3% was self-funded. However, as trade union cooperation is an integral 
part of FES’ work on promoting democracy, and is embedded in its general political work, it is difficult to determine the exact amount that FES spends exclusively on trade union cooperation.
8 Figures for 2011 are provisional.
9 The budget that we refer to is channelled through CEFOSAP, the professional trade union training institute.
10 This figure refers to national governmental funding. When combined with other governmental sources of funding (i.e. regional funding), the overall dependency on government funding is much higher.
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APPENDIx 2 TU support mechanisms questionnaire
1. Background information
- Country
- Organisation
Contact person: name, position, email address, and telephone number
2. Mapping of trade union support mechanisms
2.1. What is the structure of your organisation’s development budget?
2.1.1. Where do you receive your funding from? Please provide a percentage breakdown for 
each actor, i.e. national government, local government, multilateral bodies, and/or the private 
sector in terms of your organisation’s overall development23.
2.1.2. Are these funds unilateral or does your organisation also receive joint funding? 
2.2. Which of the various CSO and/or trade union funding mechanisms are used by the back-
donors who fund your development work2425? 
2.2.1. Do you receive mainly project or programme support?
2.2.2. Do you receive funding through framework agreements? 
2.2.3. Do you receive core funding?
2.2.4. Have you received funds through calls for proposals?
2.2.5. Does your organisation make use of specific budget grants, like grants for Educational 
Development, Humanitarian Aid, or Human Rights?
2.2.6. Are there self-funding requirements, and if so, what is the percentage? 
2.2.7. Does the back-donor also provide direct support to TUs in developing countries? 
2.2.8. Does your organisation work through intermediary networks and/or organisations as part 
of your development programmes? 
2.2.9. Are you encouraged to apply for funding in cooperation with other TUs or CSOs, i.e. 
pooled funding? 
2.2.10. What is your view of these different funding mechanisms? 
2.2.11. What, in your opinion, are the advantages and the disadvantages of the different 
mechanisms?
2.2.12. Has there been any change in the funding mechanisms (from project to programme for 
instance)?
2.3. What are the main current debates or reforms in your country (and at the multi-lateral 
level) where CSO and/or trade union support mechanisms are concerned?
23  Ask this information via email prior to the interview (key policy document).
24 Based on the typology drawn up by NORAD (2008: 21) and by Hedman & Mcdonnell (2010: 23).
25 Ask for background material, e.g. a key policy document (from the TU and the back-donor), and for financial 
information on: the % of the budget that is channelled towards CSOs (out of the overall ODA), the % of the budget that 
is channelled towards trade unions (out of the whole budget that is directed to or through CSOs).
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3. Government development agenda
3.1. Do you have to subscribe to a government development agenda? 
3.1.1. In terms of development principles?
3.1.2. In terms of geographic or thematic focus?
3.1.3. In terms of legal status? Is it a requirement for NGO status?
3.1.4. To what extent does this affect your access to funding?
3.1.5. To what extent is this problematic for trade unions?
3.1.6. How do you bring these donor requirements into line with the needs of your partners in 
the Southern Hemisphere?
3.2. Has the CSO sector been consulted regarding the development of CSO support 
mechanisms? And have trade unions been consulted specifically? 
3.2.1. Regarding the general debate?
3.2.2. Regarding specific agreements with the back-donor?
3.3. What is your experience of the relationship with the back-donor and/or government 
(partnership, mutual understanding, unequal, or conflict-ridden)?
3.4. How do you see the future in terms of donor support for trade unions (increase or 
decrease)? 
4. PCM approaches
4.1. Can you give your opinion on the Project Cycle Management (PCM) approaches that are 
demanded by donors?
4.1.1. In terms of project design and/or planning?
4.1.2. In terms of monitoring and/or reporting?
4.1.3. In terms of evaluation?
4.1.4. In terms of results-based approaches and of detailed long term planning requirements?
4.1.5. Can you choose your own indicators?
4.2. Are the existing support mechanisms for trade unions predictable? 
4.3. How does this affect your organisation’s development activities?
4.3.1. In financial terms?
4.3.2. In content terms? 
5. Diversity among CSOs
5.1. Do the existing support mechanisms for CSOs recognise the diversity in the CSO field?
5.1.1. Where recognising different actors (NGOs, social economy, private business, and trade 
unions, etc.) is concerned, do support mechanisms for the various actors in this broad group of 
CSOs differ?
5.1.2. In terms of recognising different roles for CSOs (service providers, experts, actors in the 
promotion of democracy, etc.)?
5.1.3. In terms of recognising different organisational cultures (e.g. membership-based, or 
democratically elected, etc.)?
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5.1.4. In terms of partnerships and alliances (e.g. through a network-logic, through the 
international confederation, and cooperation with NGOs, etc.)?
5.2. What are the specific attributes of TUs where the previously mentioned issues are 
concerned? 
5.2.1. What added-value would you say that TUs provide in the development field? 
5.3. Does the political nature of trade unions affect access to existing support mechanisms? 
5.3.1. In thematic terms, given that political work, advocacy, mobilisation, and opposition are 
key aspects of trade union activities?
5.3.2. Does the political colour of a government determine trade unions’ access to 
development funding?
5.4. Are there any additional issues that you would like to mention regarding TU support 
mechanisms for your organisation? 
6. Cross-divisional issues26
- Good and bad practices and/or donor principles
- Changes over time (long-term and short-term: in relation to the financial and economic 
downturn)
Comparison between trade unions and other CSOs (including private business)
26 Are a guiding line throughout the interview.
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APPENDIx 3 List of respondents
Name Country Organisation Function
Henrik Als Denmark LO/FTF Council Programme Coordinator
Frédérique 
Lellouche
France CFDT Head of Cooperation- Institut 
Belleville/Département 
international
Lotte Ockerman Belgium ABVV-FGTB Project Manager - Department 
for Trade Union Cooperation with 
the Southern Hemisphere
Stijn Sintubin Belgium ACV-CSC International Department
Maresa Le Roux Belgium ACLVB-CGSLB Programme Coordinator for 
Development Cooperation
Nina Larrea Sweden LO-TCO Method Development and 
Quality Assurance
Dian van Unen Netherlands FNV Mondiaal Head of Department at FNV 
Mondiaal
Riitta Soveri Finland SASK Programme Manager
Nina Mjoberg Norway LO Head of the International 
Department Solidarity Section 
Mark Hankin
Rudy Porter,  
Dona Dobosz
United 
States
Solidarity Centre Director of Government Affairs
Field Officer,
M&E Specialist
Gemma Arpaia Italy ISCOS Coordinator Italian and Global 
Activities
Annie Watson UK TUC International Development 
Advisor
Ken Davis Australia APHEDA International Department
Reiner 
Radermacher
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